constituted in hyper-explanation. A second, and related, reading is that such stances of hyper-explanation are a useful device for counselors to avoid being directive and/or taking on an advice-giving role. Staying with the information-giving format, we can identify two types of information-giving sequences in a given counseling session: (a) why something happened (this will include explanations primarily based on family tree) and (b) what might happen in the future (this will also draw on the family tree but will be supplemented by results from scans, predictive tests, and the knowledge geneticists have about population risk figures). Genetic risk explanations about what might or might not happen thus necessarily border on notions of uncertainty and probability. In the context of prenatal diagnosis, Rapp (1988) pointed out, "The language of genetic counseling is resolutely statistical; it is an axiom of good counseling that a patient must be told her risks before she can decide to take or refuse the test" (p. 148). This is also true in situations where a diagnosis is not possible or even in situations where a diagnosis can be made through a predictive test but the actual timing of onset cannot be forecast (as in the case of Huntington's disease).
1 In the latter case, discussions about having or not having a predictive test have to be carried out in a nondirective manner because of the unintended consequences of having the test results. and probability statements in the above sense of "not always" and "not necessarily" are particularly true of both genetic knowledge and counseling practice when it comes to determining the likelihood of genetic inheritance in a given family.
The notion of probability has been widely discussed by scholars within the analytic philosophical tradition. The early works of Kneale (1949) and Carnap (1950) are of particular interest here, despite the explicit critique of their thinking by Toulmin (1958) (see below) . Both Kneale and Carnap were keen on a theorizing of probability in relation to scientific rationality, formulated in questions such as what is probability or what do probability statements express. Kneale drew a distinction between facts (or, matters of fact)-identical with contingent truths (e.g., "My pen is red")-and principles (of modality) concerned with (im)possibility, (non)necessity, and probability/chance. The assumption here is that we rely on probability statements (based on some evidence) as and when our knowledge is insufficient to make predictions with certainty. For Kneale, "Probability is relative to evidence; and even what is known to be false may be described quite reasonably as probable in relation to a certain selection of evidence" (pp. 9-10). This then leads to his classic statement, "improbable but true," to account for "strange or surprising" happenings. Taking Kneale's point about the interrelationship between probability statements and evidence, we can argue that the claim made at a given time only takes into account available evidence. It is possible that subsequent evidence may require such a claim to be modified, without rendering the claim itself as being mistaken at the time of its utterance. Carnap more or less followed this line of argument but proposed two distinct concepts of probability, what he refers to as "Probability 1 " and "Probability 2 ." According to him, Probability 1 is a logical concept that denotes a degree of confirmation (i.e., speaker's estimation of evidence vis-à-vis a hypothesis); Probability 2 is an empirical concept that is concerned with the relative frequency of events or things with a given property having another property. Toulmin (1958) critiqued Kneale's (1949) and Carnap's (1950) positions as being abstract and thus lacking applicability to everyday settings. His own project-which links the theory of probability with our everyday use of modal terms such as probably and perhaps as ways of lessening commitment and hence responsibility-is rooted in Austin's (1962) model of speech act pragmatics. Toulmin argued that Kneale's explication of "improbable but true" (elaborated to mean "what may seem improbable but is true") is a contradiction because the first part claims possession of knowledge and the latter part announces ignorance (something like "I know it is so, but I may be wrong"). For Toulmin, such statements violate the Austinian sincerity and felicity conditions, and one might add, they also fail to observe Grice's (1975) maxims of quality and relevance. We can of course elaborate the above probability statement to read "It does seem improbable on the basis of the evidence we have, but it cannot be ruled out" (i.e., it can truly happen). As we will see in the data, such formulations do and can occur at strategic moments in the counseling session.
In a similar vein, Toulmin (1958) saw enormous difficulty with Carnap's (1950) two-fold distinction of the concept of probability and strongly argued that "frequency is not a sense of the term probability at all . . . . Frequencies will be spoken of as probabilities only so far as we are using them as measures of probability" (Toulmin, 1958, p. 79) . Toulmin pointed to three types of confusion in much of Kneale's (1949) and Carnap's theorizing. First, the failure to maintain a distinction between what an utterance states and what is implied by the speaker. For instance, "It will probably rain tomorrow" uttered by a forecaster is first and foremost a statement about tomorrow's weather, although we are free to infer what is implied in such a statement about his or her beliefs. A second confusion arises from support relations and probability relations not being kept separate, especially in Carnap's distinction between degree of confirmation and relative frequencies. This is partly because of the attempt of Kneale and Carnap to steer away from the trap of psychologism and subjectivism in their discussion of probability statements. Their overall concern with scientific objectivity (as expressed in frequency estimations) is very much echoed in Kneale's leanings toward mathematics and statistics as can be seen in his use of jargons such as "probabilification" and "probability-calculus." A third confusion, according to Toulmin, is the failure to keep "category statements" (A is B) distinct from hypothetical statements (if A, then B) in light of evidential support that a speaker uses as a manner or mode of qualifying assertions. Toulmin (1958) summarized his own position as follows:
Our probability-terms come to serve as, therefore, not only to qualify assertions, promises and evaluations themselves, but also as an indication of the strength of the backing which we have for the assertion, evaluation or whatever. It is the quality of the evidence or argument at the speaker's disposal which determines what sort of qualifier he is entitled to include in his statements: whether he ought to say, "This must be the case," "This may be the case," or "This cannot be the case": whether to say "Certainly so-and-so," "Probably so-and-so" or "Possibly so-and-so." (p. 90)
Here, we see a marriage of the logical and the psychological, the subjective and the objective aspects of how probability is discoursally realized in everyday settings. Notions of evidence and inference become foregrounded in any analysis of probability. As we will see in the genetic-counseling context, the two senses of probability, degree of confirmation and relative frequencies (including range and normalcy), will merge into one another as "qualified declarations" or "guarded undertakings" are formulated to signal the uncertainties involved in the diagnosis/prognosis of a given genetic condition.
DISCOURSAL MANIFESTATION OF PROBABILITY AS DEGREE AND AS RANGE
The discussion so far of probability statements from the analytic philosophical perspective (including that of Toulmin, 1958) suffers from the speaker and intentionality bias. But, for the purposes of my argument here, the positions outlined by Toulmin as well as Kneale (1949) and Carnap (1950) offer useful insights into how genetic counselors and their clients deal with the linkage between problems of probability, evidentiality, and inductive inferencing as they make sense of future predictions.
In our integrative framework, we can notice how Probability 1 in Carnap's (1950) sense is realized through the use of epistemic modalities. These can range from declination/disclaiming of knowledge to the use of hedging and disclaimers. Elsewhere (see Sarangi & Clarke, in press), we discuss how genetic counselors delineate their zones of expertise with use of pragmatic devices such as hedging, approximations, shields, numerical values, and so forth to express uncertainty and mitigate knowledge claims (Dubois, 1987; Prince, Frader, & Bosk, 1982; Wachtel, 1980) . The frequency sense of Carnap's Probability 2 can be extended to include aspects of range and normalcy, which will be the focus of our discussion here. It is of course worth noting the difficulty in keeping Carnap's two senses of probability distinctively different in the interactional context (see Toulmin's, 1958 , critique above). As we can imagine, these two levels of reasoning will interact constantly, and one might even argue that in genetic counseling, Probability 2 type statements will be strategically used to talk about Probability 1 . Generally speaking, disclaimers of any kind are a framing device to introduce evidence and to evaluate such evidence (i.e., information about information as explanation and as account).
In the context of genetic counseling, especially in relation to what might happen to someone in the near or distant future, the counselor is obliged to use statements of probability but mitigate these whenever possible with reference to evidence at hand. It is therefore necessary to examine the use of indirect evidence and inductive inferencing in how probability statements are managed in the interactional setting. Let us consider the opening part of a clinic where the geneticist (G) and the client (male parent, PM) jointly negotiate the agenda for discussion. Although the scan results at the time are clear, G qualifies this state of affairs when he adds, "That doesn't mean that he might not have this polycystic. . . kidney problem when he's older." This estimation is based on the evidence that the family has a history of the disease, and so, this family history as evidence overrides the clear scan results as evidence. Here, we can see two types of evidence being weighed: The family history, which may at first sight count as indirect evidence, is being compared with the scan results, which may count as direct evidence. But, in the genetic context, family history as indirect evidence can provide a strong basis for inductive inferences, especially because of the difficulties associated with calculating the precise onset of a genetic condition among family members. In Turn 2, PM inquires if a predictive test can be done now to confirm the son's genetic status, as a way of reducing uncertainty contained in the present estimation: "We have been told there's a 50 50 he either has the genes [as] I have or he hasn't" (Turn 2). What underlies this is that predictive test results can assume the status of direct evidence in preference to both family history and scan results. In many instances, parents want to go for a predictive test so that the results can help to minimize uncertainty and allow them to "look toward the future," "get on with life," "put things behind them," "put their mind to rest," and so forth. Their motives would be to seek categorical responses ("He's got or not," Turn 6) in preference to probabilistic statements ("There's a 50 50 [chance]," Turn 2). This is not to say that there are no causal explanations in genetic counseling. In the majority of instances, the causality is about genetic conditions themselves rather than how they apply to individual circumstances. This is a kind of causality in the abstract, generic sense (or what Mishler, 1984 , called objectification to demarcate the voice of medicine from that of the lifeworld). The following examples are illustrative:
• that lump is is actually here eh-is actually a nerve running (in the skin) (.) eh (.) and the swelling is due to eh ehm the the growth in in in th-in the sheath covers surrounding the nerve (.) which is eh called the fibroma (0.5) so the name just describes (.) what's happening in the [skin] basically • the condition is due to an alteration in the gene • you have a normal copy of the gene (.) and an altered copy of the gene (.) and the altered copy is the one that's causing the problems (.) .hhhh even though you've got a normal copy
The above are statements about "what is x" or "what causes x," and in this regard, they are not very different from the kinds of information and ontological explanations provided in textbooks (Sarangi, 2000) . The distinction between causality and probability is well captured by Reichenbach (1951) : Here, we are dealing mainly with probability in both senses as Carnap (1950) suggested but perhaps more along the lines of Probability 2. In crude terms, one could equate causality with certainty and probability with uncertainty. What might happen to an individual case has to be an estimation, hence the reliance on a sense of indeterminacy. 3 Indeterminacy or uncertainty, as Kneale (1949) suggested, is always linked up with evidence: That is, without any evidence, we may end up with vagueness and imprecision (Channell, 1994) . In genetic counseling, the future estimation will be based on the information available from a family tree but also from what the geneticist knows about population figures as well as scan results that are available in the present time. This would then draw on inductive inference (rather than deduction) in what Reichenbach (1951) called predictive knowledge.
4

PROBABILITY IN RELATION TO DEGREE OF COMMITMENT
Following from our earlier discussion, we can say that when speakers claim or disclaim knowledge about something, they do so on the basis of some evidence already in their possession. The notion of evidence is not as straightforward as it may seem. It may be useful here to note the distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence, as it is used in the legal sphere (Bagshaw, 1996) . Circumstantial Sarangi / GENETIC COUNSELING DISCOURSE 13 evidence (same as indirect evidence for our purposes here) would require a fair amount of inferencing, and moreover, a chain of such evidence would be necessary to establish the factual status of a claim. 5 Also, probability statements are an estimation of future happenings or nonhappenings using an inductive procedure (i.e., it is an act of determining the unknown on the basis of selective evidence). Such an estimation is intricately tied up with a degree of confirmation (i.e., a speaker's degree of commitment can act as weight). In this sense, estimation is essentially qualitative. Despite the uncertainty embedded in prediction, we recognize that estimations and probability statements are unavoidable in many situations. According to Reichenbach (1951) , "We employ probability statements because they bear upon future events; every act of planning requires some knowledge of the future, and if we have no perfectly certain knowledge, we are willing to use probable knowledge in its place" (p. 235).
We can see that this view echoes Kneale's (1949) position above. With regard to degree of commitment, Reichenbach (1951) maintained, if a speaker announces a 50-50 chance, such an announcement is based on the principle of indifference and an assumption of equality of probabilities. According to him, "The statement that a probability is one-half does not mean anything about the future, but simply expresses the fact that we have no more knowledge about the happening of the event than about that of the opposite event" (p. 235). The notion of likelihood then is intricately tied up with uncertainty about the future and with the need for making decisions in the present time. However, as we can see from above, probability statements may not help clients to make decisions, especially when they are looking for psychological and/or scientific explanations in categorical terms ("one has or has not got x").
PROBABILITY IN RELATION TO RANGE AND NORMALCY
Let us now consider how the notion of range is appealed to in probability statements. As suggested by Kneale (1949, p. 175) , the notion of range can be understood in terms of alpha-ness and beta-ness (see the appendix):
• 1. It is necessary that anything that is alpha should be beta.
• 2. It is a matter of chance whether an alpha thing is beta.
• 3. It is impossible that anything that is alpha should be beta.
Following Reichenbach (1951) , we can say that Statements 1 and 3 resemble the if-then always relation, whereas Statement 2 sounds similar to an if-then in a certain percentage relation. Also, the notion of range is linked with normalcy. In the appendix, the overlapping circles (in the middle figure) perhaps represent the genetic-counseling sce- nario. The other possibilities, as we shall see, are also invoked during a counseling session. Following Hacking (1990) , the notion of normalcy is used in the broadest sense to cover the different meanings of normal: as typical or usual, as right or wrong in the moral sense, but also as something which can be made normal through intervention. 6 As we have already discussed, a key feature of probability statements is the calculation of relative frequencies. Statements (e.g., about normal growth) are based on observations made in the past, with the assumption that such frequencies will hold for the future. So, in the context of genetic counseling, population figures are factual in the sense that they are based on observations. But, when such figures are applied to individual cases, they can only be used as a prediction: "For the frequency interpretation the degree of probability is a matter of experience and not of reason" (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 236) . So, inductive inference is the first difficulty associated with the frequency interpretation. The second difficulty concerns the applicability of a probability statement in terms of frequencies to a single case. In logical terms, there is the problem of "transfer of meaning from the general to the particular case" (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 240) . This is a paradox between psychological and scientific modes of reasoning in the context of genetic counseling. When the clients are particularly concerned about their own, individual case, a degree/frequency statement is very unhelpful: "It makes no sense to attach a degree of probability to an individual event, because one event is not capable of being measured by degrees" (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 238) . At the same time, Reichenbach (1951) maintained, "Although all these statements about what will happen are only maintained as probable, we treat them as true and act accordingly; that is, we employ them in the sense of posits" (p. 241).
DATA ANALYSIS
In what follows my focus is not so much on "what is x" or "what causes x" but what might happen or how improbable it is for something to happen. With such questions in mind, we also shift our attention from generic discussions of probability to the individual plane: how probability explanations (including inexactness, degree of confirmation, range) are contextualized in the interactional setting. I will consider data from two polycystic kidney disease (PKD) clinics and use extended extracts for detailed analysis, focusing on how probability statements are made and how indirect evidence and inductive reasoning are recruited by both counselors and clients for doing so.
The extract below is taken from the opening section of the session. Here we have a mother (PF) who is worried about her daughter (AD) Sarangi / GENETIC COUNSELING DISCOURSE 15 developing PKD. The daughter has accompanied the mother to speak with the geneticist (G2) but does not speak at all in the first extract. In Turn 2, G2 uses a perspective display series question (Maynard, 1991) to find out what PF already knows. This is particularly significant in the genetic-counseling context because clients do have a good understanding of their family network, but also because they have access to genetic knowledge through Web sites and participation in patient groups. PF, in Turn 3, refers to a causal relation between excess enzyme and brain damage. She concludes her turn with a lighthearted response: "Obviously she's not brain damaged." As far as she is concerned, if such a causal link has been in the cards since AD was 2 years old, then this is the time to reassess the situation and talk about what might happen in the future. It is clear that PF has a good grasp of how much excess enzyme AD has in her blood so as not to be a problem in itself for AD. In Turn 7, PF extends the problem to ask about the potential risks for AD's children.
It is interesting that in Turn 8, G2 dwells on AD's present condition and not the future scenarios. He thus positions himself as someone who does not want to talk about the next generation. And second, he points to range and normalcy (in the sense of average) in the present time rather than calculating risk figures and population trends. In Turn 12, G2 explicitly states that AD does not have the disease. However, that is not the end of the story. In fact, this sets up the discussion about the normal range or what may count as the normal range. Note Sarangi / GENETIC COUNSELING DISCOURSE that rather than talk about probability in the frequency sense, both G2 and PF use adjectives such as less, slightly less, and so forth to denote numerical values. But, adjectives such as these index a certain sense of degree of commitment.
In Turn 18, G2 qualifies the concept of range when he labels AD's present condition as a "gray area." Turns 21 and 23 are particularly interesting, as we see PF explicating her understanding of "gray area," on one hand, while implicitly questioning what counts as "normal," on the other hand. In her words, it is not "low enough to be normal," and that is the basis of her continual worries. In Turns 26 through 38, G2 takes up (and effectively reformulates) PF's concerns about AD's future reproductive choices (note that this was raised by PF at Turn 7). G2's answer to this is a cautious "we don't know" on the basis of the available evidence (i.e., "She's in a gray area"). There is some kind of circularity here, which is again signaled through PF's laughter (Turn 35). Against this backdrop, in Turn 38, G2 returns to his assessment of the present scenario, for example AD's enzyme levels being in the normal range that would require constant monitoring. The reproduction issues are again touched on and used as a kind of reasoning for why AD should remain concerned.
A few moments later, PF revisits the situation and asks for more guidance, with AD's future reproductive options in mind. The genetic nurse specialist (N1) joins in this part of the discussion. = difference but we we're just being ultra cautious partly because we don't know really kn-[you know it's still] a gray area we don't know = 33 PF:
[no we don't know] 34 G2: = so in this sort of situation it's always much better to be (.) to be safe [(.) than sort of] (.) than yeah and it and it you know and it it it might you = 35 PF:
[yes than sorry like you know] 36 G2: = know it is more inconvenient basically (.) *you know* but it is [(.) = 37 PF:
[ In Turn 1, PF is asking for direct advice, formulated as "where do we go from here," and these are occasions where counselors may strategically fall back on what has already been said and recycle previous talk. 7 This is also a way of talking about where we are now in preference to what lies ahead of us in the future. In Turn 8, we see G2 stressing the need for monitoring the future rather than offering a probabilistic statement. This needs to be understood in reference to the "gray area" already spoken about. G2 alludes to the general population of teenage girls (Turn 11) as a point of comparison: that AD has to be more careful than others are. Once again, we find an extended lighthearted sequence (see Data Example 2a, Turn 3, where PF mentions that AD is not brain damaged). In Turn 19, PF reinstates the main theme and goes on to legitimize her concerns as not bordering on a state of panic. A generic point is being made: Everyone wants a normal child (Turn 23). In Turn 28, PF enacts a possible future dialogue between herself and a pregnant AD. Such use of direct speech lends the future scenario some credibility and a sense of involvement. Direct speech helps to create this authenticity, but it also puts G2 as a ratified overhearer (in Goffman's, 1981, sense) . This projection to the future scenario injects the present situation with a sense of urgency. We might interpret it as the hypothetical future being projected in to the present time to underline the anxiety and the need to look for some certainty. A plan is outlined for the monitoring to be done, especially when AD has a partner. Although this might be inconvenient (and so not normal in the typical sense), the best thing for her would be to contact the hospital. Hence, when the future does get talked about, it's being done not in genetic terms but in terms of management of pregnancy.
Before we move on to the next clinical site, some general observations can be made. PF wants a probabilistic statement about AD and her children (not) developing PKD. G2 can only comment, with a high degree of confirmation, on the present condition of AD: that she does not have PKD. He then uses AD's "gray area" status (i.e., AD's excess enzyme falling outside the normal range) as indirect evidence to make further inferences and so justify why AD's future plans about pregnancy need to be constantly monitored.
In the next extended example, taken from another clinic, the father (PM) is known to have inherited the PKD gene from his mother (that is, he has the carrier status), and he speaks with a geneticist (G1) and a genetic nurse specialist (N5) because he is anxious that he might have passed it onto his children. [yes] 11 G1: = we've had (.) permission to look at your (.) mother's (.) medical notes [(1.0)] which we did (.) and (0.5) she had a (0.5) um (.) = 12 PM:
[yeah] 13 G1: = kidney (.) scan (0.5) when she was 60 61 (.) sort of age (0.5) um (.) which was (.) entirely normal (0.5) and (0.5) um (0.5) now (.) that was at (1.0) (^^^^^here) (.) but I think it (0.5) u::h (1.0) I think it showed a single small cyst in one kidney (.) which was (.) entirely normal [(0.5)] and (.) at the age of (0.5) by the age of 60 someone = 14 PM:
[yeah] A few lines are omitted where G1 explains how genes run in the family.
20 G1: one of your mother's (.) parents (.) not sure which (.) (^^^^^) (0.5) will have had (1.5) a (0.5) one okay copy of the gene (.) and one (.) with a change in it but (.) that's given them the polycystic kidney disease problem (1.0) and they'll have handed on (.) that copy (0.5) of it (.) to (1.0) the your mother's (.) affected (.) brother's (1.0) and (0.5) this copy (.) to your mother [(1.0)] she'll = 22 PM:
[right] 23 G1:
= have got (0.5) another one of these copies from (0.5) her (.) other parent (1.0) so (0.5) she's in that situation of whichever one she hands on (.) you'll be okay [(1.0 right (0.5) so she hasn't got it (.) she hasn't got it I haven't got it (.) can't have it At the outset (Turns 4 and 6), PM spells out his immediate concerns in light of the family history of PKD. In Turn 8, PM formulates his question as an "if then,' to which G1 responds in the if-then mode but qualifies it with other factors that might interfere. This is central to probability statements, that all potential intervening factors cannot be regulated at the time of making statements about the future. In Turn 11, G1 uses the scan results of PM's mother when she was about 60 as indirect evidence, and this is the basis for the inductive inference that follows. Facts known to be true from the family tree are now overridden by the scan results of PM's mother. Here, we also have formulation of range. The single cyst in the mother's kidney is described as "entirely normal at. . . the age of 60." This normality is contrasted with the fact that The if-then always formulation follows to characterize what would be regarded as a basis for claim making. This is a causal explanation, but note that the explanation is offered in the abstract sense. The notion of range here is tied with the framing of time and age. The single cyst versus the larger number of cysts have to be seen against the population age of 30 versus the age of 60, with or without PKD. It is not only that a small cyst at the age of 60 counts as "normal," it is also that anyone who has the disease would show it at the age of 30. This generalization about how this genetic condition manifests itself in the population should be seen as guarantee that PM and his children are not affected. If we were to ignore all this and think in the hypothetical sense that PM's mother had a number of cysts, then the chance of inheritance would still be 50-50 (Turn 19). This is an example of the if-then percentage formulation. Based on these assertions, G1 infers that PM and his children are in the clear. Turn 26 is a good example of an implicit if-then always formulation to mark certainty. Immediately afterward, G1 introduces new possibilities and shifts the focus from PM's mother to his father.
Data Example 3b
1 G1: well the only way you could have it would be (.) as a n::ew (.) mutation of it [(.) a] new chain occurring in you which (0.5) uh (.) or if (0.5) = 2 PM:
[ah] 3 G1: = your dad had it 4 PM: right 5 G1: okay but (.) I don't think there's any reason to (.) suspect that happening (1.0) I think your mother (.) having had that (.) normal scan means that (.) you and your mother and (.) anyone on your side of the family or her side of the family (1.0) can be reassured 6 PM: *right* s::o my children (.) are in the clear 7 G1: yes 8 PM: excellent (1.5) yeah 9 G1: obviously th-(.) yes this is a situation where it's very helpful having (1.0) with your mother having had the scan (0.5) and then allowing us permission to [(.) (^^^^^)] (.) to give you the information (.) so (0.5) = 10 PM:
[right yeah] Sarangi / GENETIC COUNSELING DISCOURSE 23 In Turn 1, G1 introduces another proviso, using other families with similar conditions as a point of reference. With an implicit if-then formulation in Turn 1, G1 posits that if someone in their 30s or 40s has normal kidney scans, then that becomes a cutoff point for not carrying out further tests and monitoring procedures for that person's children. In Turn 4, we again find PM fishing for further reassurance, and this is followed by a potential closure in Turn 7, with G1 thanking PM for coming to the clinic. However, PM comes up with further questions and doubts, and G1 is forced to talk about genes skipping a generation (Turn 17). This shows how the kind of absolute assurance that PM is seeking is not possible in a genetic-counseling context. G1's lengthy turn (Turn 17) introduces other variables that can justify his distancing from being absolutely certain. Here, we have the characterization of non-normal kidney-led deaths, which can then increase the probability of children having the condition. We have a two-way formulation (Turns 19 and 21) of the link between the causing of kidney problems and the forming of cysts. In Turn 24, PM finally asks whether the single cyst was "perfectly normal," and the response of G1 is a classic one: "You're allowed several cysts, but in having a single one is very common." Once again, G1 returns to the notion of normalcy and range as embedded in expressions such as very common and a bit more common but does not attach any numerical values. What we have here is a version of the if-then always formulation in the form of if-then not always: The cysts can be present, but they do not always lead to a kidney problem.
CONCLUSION
In the context of genetic counseling and in genetics generally, scientific reasoning is grounded in a theory of probability. Observational facts (such as family trees, scans, predictive test results, population risk figures) do constitute direct and indirect evidence to make inductive inferences about future events. In this article, genetic counselors Sarangi / GENETIC COUNSELING DISCOURSE 27 
